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The Economy and the Unpopular Incumbent

DURING ELECTIONS, DISCUSSIONS IN THE PRESS AND AMONG pundits focus on the role of the
candidates, their strategies, and messages in securing the votes needed to assume the White
House. Polls chronicle the incumbent president’s standing and report which issues voters
consider paramount. There is ample talk about national conditions, as well as progress or lack
thereof in wars. News accounts feature indicators of the health of the economy, such as the
unemployment rate, housing starts, the GDP, the Dow, and, in 2008, gas prices and foreclosure
rates. Political conventions remind voters of a candidate’s ties to a political party, a notion
capable of activating a complex amalgam of information, inferences, and inclinations among
those who consider themselves political kin of FDR, JFK, and Clinton or Reagan, and perhaps
George W. Bush.
Before asking how messages, media, and money shaped the 2008 general election
campaign, we focus here on the supposition that a combination of fundamental factors ensured
that in 2008 the stars were aligned for the Democrats. Among them, the incumbent Republican
president was unpopular, the premises of the war that he had launched in Iraq discredited, and
the economy faltering. In party identification, the Democrats held the advantage. On handling
the economy—the issue mattering most to voters—they had the edge as well.
We begin by documenting George W. Bush’s subterranean polling numbers, move to note
that leading indicators suggested an economy on the wrong track, proceed to note that on
handling the economy the Democrats had the advantage, and conclude by showing that the
electorate was populated with higher numbers of Democratic than Republican identifiers.
After exploring the blessings this bundle of factors bestowed on the eventual Democratic
nominee, we set the stage for our argument that message, media, and money nonetheless
contributed to Obama’s ballot total by isolating the percentage of the 2008 presidential vote
intention that can be predicted by party preference, ideological placement, economic
conditions, and disapproval of the presidency of George W. Bush alone.*
An Unpopular President
President George W. Bush was the albatross circling the candidacy of Republican nominee
John McCain. Not since Hubert Humphrey in 1968 had a presidential candidate so desperately
needed to decouple his fortunes from those of his party’s incumbent. Bush’s “job approval is
almost as poor as that of King George III among the colonists 240 years ago,”1 posited Peter
Brown, assistant director of the Quinnipiac University Polling Institute in late March 2008.
“The failure of the Bush presidency is the dominant fact of American politics today,” observed
Jeffrey Bell in the Weekly Standard that same month. “It has driven every facet of Democratic
political strategy since early 2006, when Democrats settled on the campaign themes that
brought them their takeover of the House and Senate in November 2006. Nothing—not even the
success of the American troop surge in Iraq—has altered or will alter the centrality of George

W. Bush and his failed presidency to Democratic planning in the remainder of 2008.”2
At no point in 2008 did a major public opinion poll find more than 43 percent of the public
approving of the incumbent’s presidency.3 As 2008 was drawing to a close, a survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center found that “just 11% said Bush will be remembered as
an outstanding or above average president—by far the lowest positive end-of-term rating for
any of the past four presidents.”4 The 25 percent at which the 43rd president’s approval
ratings landed on October 5, noted an article in the National Journal, was “only 1-percentage
point higher than President Nixon’s low of 24 percent, reached shortly before he resigned, and
3 points above President Truman’s low of 22 percent.”5
On average from mid-December 2007 through Election Day 2008, Bush scored 3.8 on a
10-point NAES favorability scale.6 Were the presidency a college course, one would be hardpressed to read this as a pass. Related measures told the same story. During the general
election, 77 percent believed the country was “seriously off on the wrong track.”7
When asked about the incumbent, voters served up a wide range of both conventional and
unexpected language expressing dismay and disdain. On May 12, 2008, for example, an
Annenberg-sponsored focus group8 of undecided independents in Charlottesville, Virginia,
responded to moderator Peter Hart’s request for “a word or phrase to describe your opinion of
George Bush as president” by saying:
DANNY:

Disappointing.

DORITA:

That was my word, too. Exact word. I’m thinking, okay, yes. I was
expecting more.
SUSAN:

Well, I don’t like to be disrespectful of the president, but I think he’s
worthless.
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NOLA:
BOB:

Not surprising.

Misleading.

MONIQUE:

Awful.

DOLORES:

Can a toilet brush go with a toilet . . . I don’t want to be disrespectful
either. I’m going to say scary.
DENNIS:

I just say he’s in a difficult position.

WILLIAM:
JOSH:

I think he’s very gullible.

Solitary.

PATRICK:

War monger.

MELINDA:

I don’t know. I don’t know what to say. I don’t have one word. All I
know is I wouldn’t want to be in his shoes.

Four months later, a focus group of citizens in Bedford, New Hampshire, offered answers
no more likely to gladden the 43rd president’s heart:
TOM:

Incompetent.

SHANNON:
DAVID:
JOAN:

Blew it.

Scary.

KATHY:
BILL:

Illiterate.

. . . disappointed.

Unqualified and incompetent.

ELIZABETH:
EMILY:
JANE:

Embarrassing.

That’s what I was going to say, embarrassing.

I was going to say sympathy.9

The implications were not lost on the Republican ticket. “We’re up against a lot,” noted
McCain’s running mate, Governor Sarah Palin of Alaska, in an interview with NBC’s Brian
Williams on October 24. “We’re up against a very unpopular president, Bush’s administration
right now, and those who want to link us to that administration.”10
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A Faltering Economy
As the presidential candidates assembled for their preprimary debates in fall 2007, the Dow
was setting records, peaking in early October at 14,164.11 Still, the country was anxious. In a
Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken at the time, three-quarters of respondents reported
that the nation was on the wrong track. By the eve of the second general election presidential
debate a year later, the Dow had lost more than 4,000 points to close on October 7, 2008, at
9,447. And the bottom wasn’t in sight.
Where in the third quarter, the GDP growth was minus one-half of 1 percent,12 in the
fourth, the contraction rate was negative 6.2 percent.13 Put simply, the economic quarter that
included the last five weeks of the election was dismal.14 Harking back to the early 1980s, an
account in the Wall Street Journal characterized the U.S. economy’s performance in the
closing months of 2008 as “its worst . . . in a quarter-century . . . ”15 In that period, business
sales plunged and consumer spending dropped at a rate “marking the worst back-to-back
declines since quarterly records began in 1947.”16

1.1 University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index. Sources: Survey of
Consumers, Reuters, and University of Michigan, http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
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FIGURE

Nor were other economic indicators reassuring. In the fourth quarter of 2008,
“[h]omebuilding tumbled at a 23.6% pace, and commercial real estate started to crumble. As
federal spending rose, state and local governments [were] pulling back. Exports growth fell at
a nearly 20% rate.”17
The other news for individuals was troubling as well. “Personal income decreased 1.2
percent for the quarter.”18 Because scholars peg electoral outcome from inferences based
largely on gains or losses in personal income and the popularity of the president, the drop in
income was especially noteworthy. If past is prologue, the University of Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index also forecast a script that ended with Barack Obama in the White House.
Driven by a collapse in housing prices and a dramatic fall in the stock market, consumer
confidence in fall 2008 was plummeting.
“When the party in power wins, the Michigan consumer sentiment index is at least 96,”
recalled McCain pollster Bill McInturff. “The three times it’s been in the ’70s, the party in
power has lost: Jimmy Carter, Gerry Ford and George H.W. Bush in ’92. In October [2008]
the number was 58. In other words, there’s not a number like this. When you look at those
numbers, you conclude that we’re going to lose the election”19 (figure 1.1).
A Democratic Advantage on Handling the Economy
At the very beginning of the election season, Iraq surpassed the economy as the issue most saw
as the central concern facing the country. But its position at the top of the list was shortlived.
Thereafter, the focal issue was the economy writ large (figure 1.2). NAES data tell us that the
economy was the most important issue for respondents regardless of their race, gender, age,
education, political identification, and so on.*
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Even before the first Iowa voter braved the ice and snow to caucus, the issue landscape
looked sunny and cloud-free for the Democrats. “The Republican Party was in a much stronger
position on issues in January 2004, 10 months before President George W. Bush won reelection and the Republicans retained their majority position in Congress,” noted a
November/December 2007 Gallup Poll report.20 When asked which party could better handle
the situation in Iraq, the public had shifted from preferring the Republicans by 16 percent in
2004 to favoring the Democrats by 10 in late 2007. On the economy, the Democratic advantage
had risen from 4 percent to 12 in the same period, and on health care from 21 to 30 percent.
Even on taxes, an issue the Republicans had owned in the1980s, the Democrats and
Republicans were basically at parity both in 2004 (when the Democrats were up 4) and in late
2007 (when they were ahead by 2).

1.2 Percent of Respondents Who Cited “Iraq War/Terrorism” and the “Economy” as the
Most Important Problem (5-day PMA). Source: NAES08 telephone survey.
FIGURE

The Economy
After looking back at its measures since 1982, Gallup concluded in late 2007 that its “longterm trend for which party can better handle the economy finds the Democrats doing well on a
historical basis.”21 The country’s oldest polling firm then offered an ominous forecast for the
Republicans. “[W]hile it is not unusual for the Republicans to be at parity with or behind the
Democrats on this measure, their current 12-point deficit is on the high side. If a disadvantage
this large persists in 2008, it could spell trouble for the party if the economy figures as a major
issue for voters.”22 In February 2008, Pew confirmed that “a majority (53%) . . . says the
Democrats are better able to handle the economy, which has become the leading issue in the
presidential campaign.”23 In every head-to-head comparison in the Washington Post/ABC
survey between March and Election Day 2008, Obama topped McCain on this issue.24 Not

since the Dukakis-Bush race of 1988 had the Post-ABC poll showed a Republican outpacing
the Democrat on this question as Election Day neared.25 Throughout the general election
season, data from the NAES show an Obama advantage on the perceptions of which candidate
would best handle the economy as well (figure 1.3).

1.3 Perceptions of Which Candidate Would Handle the Economy Better (5-day PMA).
Source: NAES08 telephone survey.
FIGURE

A Democratic Advantage in Party Identification
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The disposition of individuals to tell a pollster that they were Republicans began dissipating
after the 2004 election (figure 1.4).
The effects of a frustrating war, faltering economy, and failing president are reflected in
the outcome of the 2006 election, which flipped control of both the U.S. House and Senate to
the Democrats and spiked the number of voters calling themselves Democrats. That shift
continued into the 2008 election. In 2004, a Pew survey found 33 percent identified as
Republicans and 35 percent as Democrats. In 2008, 27 percent were self-described
Republicans and 36 percent self-identified as Democrats. The 2008 NAES produced similar
results (26.7 percent Republicans, 36.1 Democrats).26
In the contest to sign up adherents, the Democrats handily bested those on the other side as
well. Almost 74 percent (73.5) of those eligible were registered by Election Day—an
increase of 10.1 million. While from 2004 to the end of 2008 Democratic registration
increased 1.4 percent, or 2,916,000 million, during the same period, the Republicans tallied
only half that amount (1,458,000).27
Of course, identification doesn’t necessarily translate into election of the advantaged
party’s presidential nominee. “[T]he Republican Party apparently enjoyed a party-

identification advantage among actual voters (that is, nonvoters are omitted) in all contests
from 1904 through 1932, and the Democrats an advantage in all contests from 1936 through
2000,” notes political scientist David Mayhew. “Yet in only fourteen of these twenty-five
instances did the party that actually won the presidency enjoy a party-identification edge
among voters at the time. Coin flips would have brought twelve and a half such victories,
barely a worse showing.”28

1.4 Trends in Party Identification, 2000 to 2008. Source: Pew Research Center for the
People & the Press, “Fewer Voters Identify as Republicans. Democrats Now Have the
Advantage in ‘Swing’ States,” March 20, 2008 (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/773/fewervoters-identify-as-republicans).
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One explanation may be that voters sometimes consider the other party’s nominee an
ideological kin. If so, Obama’s party identification and voter registration surplus might be
trumped by McCain’s ideological advantage. In 2008, 38.4 percent of those surveyed by the
NAES (by telephone) said they were very or somewhat conservative, while only 26 percent
said they were very or somewhat liberal.29 This trend has proven durable; the share of
Americans calling itself liberal, moderate, or conservative has remained stable for decades.
This was true even as the Democratic Party identification advantage was widening.30
According to the NAES data, Democrats and independents are less ideologically
predictable than their Republican counterparts.* Sixty-eight percent of self-identified
Republicans consider themselves conservative, compared to the 42 percent of Democrats who
see themselves as liberal. However in our data, party identification is a slightly stronger
predictor of how a person will vote than ideology, adding weight to the Obama party
advantage.31
Still all of this raises the question: how did a person widely perceived to be liberal
(figure 1.5) win the votes of conservatives?
The cross-ideological draw of the senator from Illinois was stronger than that of the
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Republican Party nominee.* Not only did the Democrat do better with self-identified liberals
than McCain did with self-identified conservatives, but he decisively carried moderates.
Similar to our data, exit polls showed that 20 percent of conservatives voted for Obama. The
Illinois senator also carried a majority of those who considered themselves to be neither
Republicans nor Democrats but independents. Still, both candidates carried over 85 percent of
those who identified with their own party.32
Using the 2008 NAES phone postelection panel data to compare the 17.4 percent of
conservatives voting for Obama against other conservatives, we find that those for the
Democratic ticket were significantly more likely to be black, Hispanic, lower income, and
inclined to believe that their personal economic situation had worsened in the past year.* The
largest and most robust predictor in our statistical model is race. Among conservatives, blacks
are 40.79 times more likely to vote for Obama than nonblacks. In our postelection survey over
85 percent of black conservatives reported voting for Obama.

1.5 Perceptions of Candidate Ideology. Sources: NAES00 telephone survey, 6/01/00 to
Election Day, N = 38,764; NAES04 telephone survey, 6/01/04 to Election Day, N = 40,898;
NAES08 telephone survey, 6/01/08 to Election Day; N = 25,654.
FIGURE

In electoral college terms, these shifts meant that liberal Obama took back states that had
been won by centrist Clinton in 1992 and/or 1996 but had been taken by Bush in 2000 and/or
2004: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, and Ohio. Obama did not win some
states won by Clinton, including Arkansas (home to Clinton), Tennessee (home to Gore) and
West Virginia, but picked up states Clinton did not carry: Virginia, North Carolina, and
Indiana. The fact that McCain contested Pennsylvania to the end indicates how difficult his
task was. Pennsylvania has been won by the Democratic presidential nominee since 1992. Of
the states that Bush won in 2004, Obama recaptured nine: Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia.
Unsurprisingly, voters did not necessarily pull the same party’s lever in the voting booth in
2008 as they had in 2004. In the 2008 NAES postelection panel, 17 percent of respondents

who said that they voted for incumbent president George W. Bush in 2004 reported balloting
for Obama, while 7.6 percent who said that they voted for Democratic Senator John Kerry in
2004 did the same for Senator McCain, a net advantage of almost 10 percent for the
Democrats. Moreover in 2008, Democratic turnout was up and Republican down. This proved
particularly important in North Carolina and Virginia, which both moved to Obama’s column.
Party, Ideology, Incumbency, and the Economy in Predicting the 2008 Vote
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Scholars of politics have found that economic growth and the incumbent’s popularity account
for most of the variance in presidential vote.33 The predictions are less reliable when the socalled fundamentals do not dramatically tilt in one direction or the other;34 when the country is
at war, as was the case in 1952 and 1968;35or, as Gore’s failure in 2000 suggests, when one
campaign neglects to do something the models presuppose, such as claiming credit for
prosperity that occurred when the candidate’s party controlled the White House.36
In most years, forecasts modeled by political scientists have been accurate within a
percent or two37 and as we noted earlier the forecasters anticipated a clear Democratic
victory in 2008. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that the McCain advisors could not conjure up
a plan that might have taken them to victory because their assessment was on the same page as
the forecasters. In lay terms, a faltering economy and an unpopular incumbent predict a win for
the party peering at the White House from outside the wrought iron gates on Pennsylvania
Avenue.
Here we replicate these assumptions as best as our survey questions permit, using the
2008 telephone NAES postelection panel to see how well party identification, ideological
placement, incumbent approval rating and economic perceptions predict vote in 2008. Table
1.1 outlines a probit regression model predicting an Obama two-party vote. The predictor
variables in the model38 are party identification, ideology, voting for Bush in 2004, Bush
approval ratings, the belief that the national economy is worse than a year ago, and the belief
that personal economy is worse than a year ago. These last two variables are often thought of
as sociotropic voting and pocketbook voting.39 The dependent variable in the model is from
the postelection wave of the panel while the predictor variables come from the pre-election
wave.
We apologize for the use of terms such as “explained variance,” which is the percentage of
variability in a dependent variable, that is, an Obama vote that can be statistically attributed to
independent variables. For a simple example, knowing a person’s birthday can explain his or
her age by 100 percent. Knowing a person’s eating habits may only partially explain his or her
body mass index (BMI), since other variables, such as genetics, physical activity, and so on,
can explain other variance in BMI.
Examining explained variance allows us to see how much of an impact these fundamental
variables have on vote decisions. Therefore, the first statistic of note is the McKelvey and
Zavoina R2, which estimates the variance in our dependent variable explained collectively by
our independent variables.40 It suggests that 77 percent of the variance in the Obama two-party
vote variable is explained by these few variables. When one adds to this finding the fact that

Obama outspent McCain and ran a better campaign, the likelihood that he would win was high.
In the chapters that follow, we will factor the power of campaign messages into our
explanation. Then, in chapter 12, we will add the money advantage to the equation.
TABLE

1.1. Predicting Obama Two-Party Vote
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Finally, in chapter 13, we will ask what difference, if any, campaign messages made, over and
above the effects of party identification, ideology, incumbent popularity, and perception of the
economy. We will also ask what effect, if any, campaign communication had on perceptions of
the economy and the candidates’ ability to handle it.
A few points of note: First, in this model, party identification and ideology are strong
predictors of how individuals say they voted.41 Approval of Bush’s handling his job as
president and voting for Bush in 2004 produced equally strong effects in the model. This
suggests, as we will discuss in chapter 2, that President Bush played a large role in this
election. The respondent’s assessment of his or her personal economic condition or national
economic conditions did not predict an Obama vote in this model. There are a few reasons for
this. First, 83.9 percent of respondents reported that their economic situation was either the
same as or worse than it was a year ago. With such a high ceiling effect and a lack of variance
within this predictor variable, meaningful relationships are difficult to tease out statistically.
Second, we are looking at individual-level data and perceptions of the economy, not an
aggregate economic indicator. Political scientist Gerald H. Kramer noted many discrepancies
between macro- and micro-level studies linking the economy to vote choice and argued that
aggregate-level time-series analyses produce better results. In other words, the individuallevel data reported here may not detect the economy’s role in the outcome. We did find a
moderate correlation at the aggregate level. However, our economic indicator did not produce
a lagged effect on voting behavior, suggesting that although these two variables may move
together, shifts in economic conditions do not appear to precede and influence votes for
Obama.42*
As we will show in chapter 8, the economy was at play in this election, even though we do
not show statistical evidence for that here. In a later chapter, we will suggest that perceptions
of the candidates’ abilities to handle the economy were directly linked to vote choice in the
presence of controls.
One explanation for the minimal net effect of campaign communication may of course be
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that two equally skilled and comparably financed teams cancel out the effects of each other’s
messages and media.43 Messages may have specific, shortlived influences on certain groups of
people, but when taken together the net effect of all campaign communication from both parties
on an election outcome may be limited.
If campaigns do matter, some surmise that it may be by activating such “fundamentals” as
perception of the strength of the economy and of party identification and political ideology. In
other words, campaigns may serve simply to vivify existing voter preferences or, in the
phrasing of political scientists Andrew Gelman and Gary King,44 foster “enlightened
preferences.” Echoing Gelman and King, political scientist Thomas Holbrook found that
campaigns basically provide voters with information that helps them align with the candidate
to whom they were predisposed all along.45
The communication effects that have been located have in general been minor and, as such,
not likely to undermine the standard models’ predictions. So, for example, Bartels found small
changes in percent of vote due to priming in the 1980 and 1996 elections46 and also identified
small instances of persuasion effects on candidates’ image in 1980, 1984, and 1988. He
concludes, “While persuasion effects of this magnitude are clearly large enough to be
electorally significant under the right circumstances, they are also clearly small enough to be
roughly consistent with aggregated-level evidence that ‘the outcome of recent elections can be
predicted within a few percentage points in the popular vote, based on events that have
occurred before Election Day.’ ”47
Before we move to chapters on the overarching themes of the 2008 general election, it is
important that we note that messages and money aren’t factors in the forecasting models that
correctly predicted more than two months before Election Day that Obama would win
handily.48 Much of the past research on the impact of campaigns assumes that during the
general election the two major-party candidates are running campaigns with equal resources
and skill. Under those circumstances we would expect the communication of each side to
simply cancel out the effects of the other.49 Nor did the 2008 models anticipate the collapse of
the U.S. economy in mid-September, a change that should have widened the gap separating the
Democratic ticket’s final vote total from that of its Republican counterpart.
With an estimated $5.3 billion spent by candidates, political parties, and interest groups,
the 2008 campaign was the costliest in U.S. history.50 If equally distributed between the two
major presidential campaigns, past research suggests that the simple fact of heavy spending
wouldn’t affect outcome. However, hamstrung by McCain’s decision to accept federal
financing, in the 2008 general election, the Republicans were swamped by a message tsunami
from a campaign able to outspend them nationally and in virtually every battleground state. In
other words, the financial advantage resided on the same side as the structural one. To
compound Obama’s advantage, he also ran what even his opponents characterized as an
almost flawless general election campaign, while, as we will show in later chapters, McCain
and his running mate stumbled at key points in the general election. We wonder why the
Obama spending and tactical advantage didn’t widen the margin between the two candidates
beyond the forecasters’ predictions. By the end of the book, we hope to have provided a
preliminary answer to the question of whether the Obama campaign’s saturation of the paid
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media affected the disposition to vote for Obama in the general election. And did the messages
purchased with that money matter?

